South Carolina Law Review
Volume 48
Issue 1 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW

Article 3

Fall 1996

Administrative Law
William B. Swent

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William B. Swent, Administrative Law, 48 S. C. L. Rev. 1 (1996).

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Swent: Administrative Law

SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
AUTUMN 1996

VOLUME 48

NUMBER 1

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
SOUTH CAROLINA'S ALT: CENTRAL PANEL, ADMINISTRATIVE
COURT, OR A LITTLE OF BOTH?
I. INTRODUCTION:

South Carolina's fledgling Administrative Law Judge Division (AI.D)
strikes a blow to the old adage "You can't fight city hall!" Currently and since
the AL/D's inception, parties involved in disputes with administrative agencies
voice their concerns to ALJs as opposed to the former hearing officers who
were employed by the agencies themselves. The appearance of bias has been
eliminated, and public confidence in agency function has risen in response.'
Additionally, administrative process under the new adjudicative structure is
arguably more efficient. Like most, these improvements come at an expense.
The statutory framework establishing the ALID, its duties, and the scope of
its authority yet requires some clarifying revision. This article is offered to
point out the advantages of South Carolina's new administrative law system in
spite of the statutory inconsistencies and in contrast to ALT structuring in other
states and the federal system. Further, by focusing on the procedural steps in
an administrative appeal, the aim is to increase the reader's understanding of
ALT jurisdiction and to highlight the impact of potential future developments.

1. See Chief Judge Marvin F. Kittrell's conclusions in Marvin F. Kittrell, ALIs in South
Carolina,7 S.C. LAW., May/June 1996 at 42, 44. For perspectives that allude to public distrust
in the administrativearena, see Jay Bender, The South CarolinaFreedom ofInformationActfrom
the PrivatePracticePerspective, 27 S.C. BAR C.L.E. DivISION 3 (1995) (stating that the origins
of the freedom of information movement were closely tied to a distrust for governmental
agencies); COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNTrED STATES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROcESS:
BETTER MANAGEMENT IS NEEDED 1 (1978) (finding that the decisions of pre-ALJ hearing
officers in the federal system were often suspect); and Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Administrative Law
Adjudicationfor the Twenty-first Century, 24 COLO. LAW. 993, 994 (1995) (noting the power of
public opinion and concluding that the public's recent call for "Total Quality Management" has
particular application in the realm of administrative government).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Various OrganizationalModels of Administrative Law
Authors Malcolm C. Rich and Wayne E. Brucar, in a concise look at the
developing central panel approach to administrative law, recognize three
fundamental systems of administrative adjudication. 2 The three arrangements
differ primarily in the degree of independence they grant to their constituent
ALJs. At the low end of the spectrum, the "agency staff" approach offers the
least autonomy? In the middle, the "central panel" or "central pool" system
provides full agency separation for its adjudicators.' In this format, however,
ALT decisions remain subject to agency acceptance, rejection, or modification.5 At the extreme high level of independence, the "administrative court"
system generally grants exclusive jurisdiction over statutorily defined,
contested cases; further, review of administrative court decisions goes directly
to the true judicial branch.6 Very few states, if any, employ a pure version of
one of the three alternatives. 7 Likewise, South Carolina's administrative
system of process blends features of the central panel and administrative court
forms. Section III below presents a more detailed view of each system by
highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of ALJ independence in South
Carolina.
B. The Current Statutory Regime
Traditional administrative process is federal in origin. 8 As such, state
administrative law borrows much of its foundations from federal statutes and
decisions. 9 The South Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (SCAPA) is no
exception. Prior to 1993's restructuring of government, 10 administrative

2. MALCOLM C. RICH & WAYNE E. BRUCAR, THE CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: A SURVEY OF SEVEN STATES 10-11 (1983).

3. See id. at 10.
4. See id. at 11.
5. See id. at 10.
6. See id. Messrs. Rich & Brucar point out that in 1983 the administrative court system was
in effect only in Maine and Missouri and even there only to a very limited extent. Id.
7. See Gerald E. Ruth, Unification of the AdministrativeAdjudicatory Process:A Emerging
Framework to Increase "Judicialization"in Pennsylvania, 5 WIDENER J.PUB. L. 297, 321-24
(1996).
8. For a comprehensive historical treatment of developments in state and federal administrative law, see, e.g., id. at 11-13; 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 1.4-1.7 (3d ed. 1994).
9. See 1 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7-8, 12 (1965).

10. Act of June 18, 1993, No. 181, §§ 11-19, 1993 S.C. Acts 1407, 1433-448 (codified as
amended at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-310 to -660 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995)).
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process in South Carolina was, in fact, based on the 1961 Model State
Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA)," and the MSAPA is quite a close
relative to federal administrative law." Despite the thorough reference base
that arises from its time-tested origins, South Carolina's administrative process
presents a challenge to even the best decipherer of statutes. 3
At the heart of the confusion lies a recurrent inability to reconcile
individual agency statutes with the SCAPA. 4 This sort of difficulty should
not be surprising. After all, agency promulgation statutes written well before
the restructuring of government and primarily with executive goals in mind
can hardly be expected to fully honor the dictates of an independent administrative adjudicatory process. Also, to the extent that the new administrative
process represents a check on agency authority, a second source of tension is
revealed. One need go no further than the definitions section of the SCAPA
to find the beginnings of conflict. "Agency" is defined in South Carolina Code
section 1-23-310 "to include the AJ division." Indeed, the AL Division is
an autonomous agency of the executive branch; however, the failure to make
a referential distinction creates an obstacle that pervades throughout much of
the remainder of the statute.' 5 For instance, a fundamental precept of
administrative law is the forestalling of judicial review until all internal agency
remedy is exhausted.' 6 Generally, an agency marks this exhaustion of remedy

11. David E. Shipley, South CarolinaAdministrativeLaw, 1989 S.C. BAR C.L.E. DIVISION
1-3 (2d ed. 1989).
12. The evolution of the several administrativeprocedure acts is really quite tidy. In 1941 E.
Blythe Stason, Dean Emeritus of the University of Michigan Law School and former
administratorof the American Bar Foundationwrote a report that became the basis of the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act (promulgated in 1946). 1 COOPER, supranote 9, at 6. Dean Stason
also was a primary drafter of the 1946 Model State Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA). Id.
Further, Dean Stason acted as committee chairman for the group that revised the MSAPA into
its 1961 version. Id. at 7. The draftsman's first effort having been the federal APA, it seems
logical to conclude that the federal system and its experiences were the source from which he
drew in creating the MSAPA. Writing in 1965, Mr. Cooper added credence to this conclusion
by pointing out the extensiveness of debate over the federal system and the rather neglectful
treatment of state systems. Id. at 1.
13. Professor Shipley states that even in 1989 the first attempt at codifying South Carolina's
administrative process was not well understood. Shipley, supra note 11, at 1-4.
14. Id.; see also Home Health Services, Inc. v. South Carolina Dep't of Health & Envtl.
Control, 298 S.C. 258, 379 S.E.2d 734 (Ct. App. 1989) (reconciling an apparent conflict with
DHEC promulgation statutes and the SCAPA); Pringle v. Builders Transport, 298 S.C. 494, 381
S.E.2d 731 (1989) (stating that conflicts between agency promulgation statutes and the SCAPA
should be resolved in favor of the APA). The Pringle case may be limited to its facts-coflicts
between the Workers Compensation Act and the SCAPA.
15. Mr. Frank E. Cooper, contributor to the 1961 Revised MSAPA, has also noted the
exceptional importance of definitions in the administrative procedure statutes. For a more
comprehensive treatment see 1 COOPER, supra note 9, at 95.
16. E.g., id. at 561; 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 8, § 15.2.
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by rendering its "final decision."7 Because the definition of an agency in
South Carolina Code section 1-23-310 includes the ALJD, the current scheme
implies that AU_ adjudication constitutes this final decision. As a result,
obvious questions arise: What level of conclusiveness must an agency decision
reach before a contested case is ripe for AU_ review, and subsequently, what
are the limits of AJ authority in issuing a final decision? Can the ALJD
consider the facts afresh and create its own remedy in all particulars or is it
bound to simply approve or deny "agency" recommendations? Section IV
below, entitled "Statutory Framework," is meant to aid the practitioner who
faces these questions.
C. Future Developments in Administrative Law
Tabled at the end of the 1996 legislative session, House Bill 3427
recommended several worthy changes to the SCAPA."8 Actually this
legislation would have had more of a clarifying effect than one of substantive
alteration. The bill primarily addressed South Carolina Code sections 1-23380, 1-23-600, 1-23-610 and corresponding agency statutes. 9 Section V
below takes a closer look at the particular ramifications of this bill and any
similar future legislation. Lastly, in considering the impact of legislation and
the probabilities of change, the practitioner is advised to take note of
underlying constitutional issues not presently discussed.'
III. DISCUSSION
In 1993 the General Assembly's restructuring of government included
amendments to the SCAPA and essentially created the ALJ Division.21 The
official purpose of the AUD is to "provide a neutral forum for fair, prompt

17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
18. H.R. Res. 3427, 111th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1995).
19. Id.
20. E.g., William A. McGrath et al., Project:StateJudicialReviewofAdministrativeAction,
43 ADMIN. L. REv. 571, 596 (1991) (outlining due process issues and acknowledging that present
systems do not fit perfectly within separation of powers boundaries, but maintaining that some
deviation is essential to efficient government); Michael Asimov, The Scope of JudicialReview
of Decisions of CaliforniaAdministrativeAgencies, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1189 (1995) (presenting
a curious view of the link between administrative accountability and the appropriate standard of
review of ALI decisions). At the request of the General Assembly, USC Law School Professor
James F. Flanagan has reported on several of the more current constitutional issues. JAMES F.
FLANAGAN, JUDICIAL COUNCIL TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY AND THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF S.C.,
REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MAKING THE SOUTH CAROLINA AL
DIVISION A PART OF THE UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM 14-25 (1995).
21. Act of June 18, 1993, No. 181 §§ 11-19, 1993 S.C. Acts 1407, 1433-448 (codified as
amended at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-310 to -660 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995)).
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and objective hearings for any person affected by an action, or proposed action
of certain agencies of the State of South Carolina."' There are six administrative law judges who are elected by the legislature to serve staggered five
year terms.' The qualifications required of ALJs equal those of justices and
judges of the regular judiciary.24 Despite some conjecture otherwise,25 the
ALJD is clearly part of the executive branch. 26 The Division is, therefore,
not judicial, but "quasi-judicial" in nature.27 Simply put, this quasi-judicial
classification relieves the Division of the full burdens of res judicata 2t and
stare decisis. 29 The AUJD opened for business in March of 1994, and

22. S.C. ADMIN. LAW JUDGE Div., ANNUAL REPORT 1993-1994, at 1 (1994).

23. Id.
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-510 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.C. CONsT. art V.
25. Felter, supra note 1, at 994 (claiming South Carolina has not decided to which branch of
government its ALJD belongs).
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-500 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
27. S.C. ADMIN. LAW JUDGE DIv., ANNUAL REPORT 1993-1994, at 4 (1994).
28. See infra note 29. There is some slight confusion in the South Carolina cases that address
the issue of whether agency decisions are subject to the doctrine of res judicata. Without question,
Earle v. Aycock, 276 S.C. 471,475,279 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1981) and South CarolinaDepartment
ofSocial Services v. Winyah NursingHomes, Inc., 282 S.C. 556, 563, 320 S.E.2d 464, 469 (Ct.
App. 1984) hold that the doctrine of res judicata applies to the decisions of state agencies. The
second instance of litigation in these two cases was, however, before the circuit court, not the
respective agencies themselves. Confusion is wrought by SaintPhilip'sEpiscopalChurchv. South
CarolinaAlcoholic Beverage Control Commission, 285 S.C. 335, 339-40,329 S.E.2d 454, 456
(Ct. App. 1985), which, incidentally, cites Earle v. Aycock. Church leaders at Saint Philip's
objected to the ABC's licensing a restaurant because ofthe eatery's close proximity to the Church
and, presumably, a general disdain for alcohol consumption. Id. at 337, 329 S.E.2d at 455. The
circuit court declared the litigation improper due to the bar of collateral estoppel (no appeal
having been taken from the ABC's final decision). Id. at 339, 329 S.E.2d at 456. The court,
however, also concluded that a subsequent contest (before the ABC) of the license on grounds
other than proximity would not be barred. Id. This final statement by the court in Saint Phillip's
mocks res judicata's bar to relitigation of not only issues previously decided but also those that
could have been heard.Likely, the Saint Phillip'sdecision is anomalous or just plain incorrect.
At any rate, the character of the ALJD is now more judicial than the agency, adjudicatory bodies
of old. As such, its tenets of quasi-judicial status are strengthened, and those quasi-legislative
are embraced to a lesser degree. That is, South Carolina's shift to a corps of ALJs makes the
holding of Earlev. Aycock more firmly the law-even as regards attempts to relitigate before the
ALJD.
29. E.g., 2 COOPER, supra note 9, at 503-34 (1965) (pointing to the legislative character of
a quasi-judicialbody as justificationto allow it to "change its mind"); 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 6.63 (1985) ("Agencies need more freedom to change
policies and meet new law enforcement exigencies." (citing International Harvester Co. v.
OSHRC, 628 F.2d 982, 984-86 (7th Cir. 1980))). The ALJD cannot, however, arbitrarilyreject
the reasoning of its prior decisions; after all, there must be logic in the evolution of agency
policy. See 330 Concord St. Neighborhood Ass'n v. Campsen, 309 S.C. 514, 517 424 S.E.2d
538, 540 (Ct. App. 1992); see also Weaver v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 309 S.C. 368,
423 S.E.2d 340 (1992) (suggesting that an unjustified change in agency position will amount to

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

although the Division will not admit to being at full capacity, statistics show
the ALJs are hard at work.3"
A. The Issue of ALJ Independence
Proponents of administrative reform often cite the need for greater
independence in agency adjudication.3 Opponents of reform parse the phrase
"creeping judicialization" and worry about the erosion of agency policy and
clout.32 Both sides of this issue are represented in the following summary of
advantages and disadvantages.
B. Advantages
1. Diversity of Cases Heard
As a centralized corps, the ALJD sees a diverse collection of cases arising
from the multitude of agencies within its jurisdiction. Clearly, the greater its
jurisdiction the more diverse will be the issues that the ALJD addresses. The
benefits of this diversity are two-fold. Authors Rich and Brucar see the
33
primary benefit being that the ALJs will maintain a fresh perspective.
Writing for the National Conference of Administrative Law Judges in 1986,
Judge E. Earl Thomas, a Deputy Chief Judge in the federal administrative
34
system, opined that this variety also created more of a challenge to AUs.
Taken in context, Judge Thomas was making a positive comment about job
satisfaction.

a violation of equal protection and due process).
30. Interviewwith H. Lee Smith, Clerk of Court, S.C. ALJ Division, in Columbia, S.C. (Jan.
9, 1996); S.C. ADMIN. LAW JUDGE DIV., ANNUAL REPORT 1993-1994, at 8-9 (1994).
31. The evolution of reform in the federal administrative system provides a good example of
the rising call for adjudicative independence. This aspect of the federal system's development is
outlined in Frederick Davis, JudicializationofAdministrative Law: The Trial 2ype Hearing and
the ChangingStatus of the Hearing Officer, 1977 DUKE L.J. 389, 407 (1977). See also E. EARL
THOMAS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: THE CORPS ISSUE 2 (1986); Palmer & Bernstein,
EstablishingFederalAdministrativeLaw Judgesas an Independent Corps:The Heflin Bill, 6 W.
NEw ENG. L. REv. 673 (1984); C. Stuart Greer, Note, Expanding the JudicialPower of the
AdministrativeLaw Judge to Establish Efficiency and Fairnessin AdministrativeAdjudication,
27 U. RICH. L. REv. 103, 117 (1993).
32. RICH & BRUCAR, supra note 2, at 12 (citing comments made by, then professor, Antonin
Scalia of the University of Chicago Law School at an ABA conference on the Role of the Judge
in the 1980s).
33. Id. at 13.
34. THOMAS, supra note 31, at 9; see also Ruth, supranote 7, at 330-31. Gerald Ruth, Chief
Administrative Law Judge, Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, states, point blank, that "ft]his
variety would combat the boredom that judges who continuously preside over the same issues
face." Id.
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2. Better Reasoned Opinions
Detachment from the individual agencies may also lead to better reasoned
opinions."5 Dual logic resides within this conclusion. If an administrative law
judge feels equally accountable to both parties in a contested case, the judge's
reasoned explanation of both sides of the dispute will be more detailed. 36 This
conclusion gains weight after examination of a non-centralized system in which
hearing officers are less likely to explain certain issues because they expect
their main audience to be agency staff-persons who are acutely aware of the
legal and factual arguments involved. Additionally, the greater qualification
standards37 and increased exposure to adversarial proceedings inherent in the
"AJ corps" approach should increase the legal competence demonstrated in
ALJ opinions.
3. Increased Economic Efficiency
Messrs. Rich and Brucar explain that the corps approach may also be less
expensive.38 They reason that "larger agencies will not have to keep all the
ALJs they need to handle cases [only] during peak periods[, and s]maller
agencies will always have AU's available to them without having to pay larger
sums to hire practicing lawyers, for example, to serve as temporary AIJs."3
These authors further point out the savings that will result from a single set of
support staff, a single office, a single set of account books, and other
innovative measures.' Judge Thomas also cites savings from more efficient
management and the elimination of otherwise duplicative expenses, and he
supports his claims with reports from states that have implemented central
panel systems.41
4. Less Agency Bias
Proponents of the corps approach also claim that detachment of judges
from their respective agencies makes them less likely to blindly honor agency
policy42 and presumably more likely to issue a fair decision. It is, however,
35. The South Carolina Code specifies what the record in a contested case shall include. One
element of these requirements is "any decision, opinion or report by the officer or administrative
law judge presiding at the hearing." S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-320 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
Note that this section does not seem to require a report or decision.
36. RiCH & BRUCAR, supra note 2, at 13 (citing the testimony of Judge William Fauver
during Hearings on AdministrativeLaw Judge System Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the

Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp., 96th Cong. 28 (1980)).
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-510 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
38. RICH & BRUCAR, supra note 2, at 13.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. THOMAS, supra note 31, at 10.
42. Greer, supra note 31, at 120; see also Ruth, supra note 7, at 321-24 ("The [independent]
Administrative Law Judges would not be dependent upon the agency-party for continued
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precisely this drift away from policy-based decisions that opponents cite as the
downside of the AIJ corps approach.43 Mitigating either argument is the fact
that so long as some AIJ decisions are reviewed by the adversarial agency,
for rejection or revision, true freedom from agency bias does not exist."
Thus, only the pure "administrative court" system fully attains this advantage. 45 Therefore, to the extent South Carolina's AJ decisions are not
subject to agency review (and instead go directly to the circuit courts for
further resolution) this state's system has merit.
5. Increased Public Confidence in Agency Action
The State of Colorado solicits public opinion as to the quality of its
judiciary.46 Surveys evaluating the function of the Colorado central panel
system in 1992 showed an 88 percent approval rating.47 Chief Judge Edwin

employment, salary, promotions, benefits, office space, parking permits, etc., and would not be
subject to retribution or 'control' via diminution of those items.").
43. See, e.g., Felter, supra note 1, at 993 (directly confronting the value of agency expertise
and policy as a basis for contested case decisions); James F. Flanagan, Standardof Proof and
ScopelStandardofReview: Definitions, Differences, Distinctions,27 S.C. BAR C.L.E. DIVISION
81 (1995). Professor Flanagan cites BoardofBank Controlv. Thomason, 236 S.C. 158, 169, 113
S.E.2d 544, 549 (1960) and Failev. South CarolinaEmployment Security Commission, 267 S.C.
536, 540, 230 S.E.2d 219, 221-22 (1976) as establishing the deferential standard for judicial
review of agency decisions. Id. at 81-82.
Arguments that this "due deference" standard should apply to ALJs hearing contested cases
finds limited support in the language of South Carolina Code section 1-23-330(4), a prerestructuring, pre-ALJD provision. If these arguments should hold, those fearful of eroded agency
policy will gain solace. Section 1-23-330(4), however, does not actually speak of deference; it
merely states that "an agency's experience" and "technical competence" may be considered.
Therefore, the stronger position is a realization that, by separating the adjudicating body from
the individual agencies and not explicitly providing for a deference standard, the General
Assembly effectively eliminated the traditional nod to "agency expertise." See Evangelism
Outreach, Inc., Docket No. 95-ALJ-17-0180-CC (March 1996).
44. RICH & BRUCAR, supra note 2, at 13. The authors outline the extent of adjudicative
independence in the federal system. Essentially, tenure, promotion, and compensation of the
agency affiliated ALJs in the federal system are beyond their respective agency's control. Id. at
8-9. On the other hand, the subordination of ALJ decisions remains. That is, ALUdecisions are
still subject to agency acceptance or rejection. Id. at 8. This subordination precludes gaining true
independence. Davis, supra note 31, at 407. Note also Rich and Brucar's colorful discussion of
agency hostility in the face of change. RICH & BRUCAR, supra note 2, at 20-21.
45. For an example of a pure administrative court system, refer to Missouri's Administrative
Hearing Commission. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 621.015 to 621.189 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
Note, however, the Missouri Commission's jurisdiction is limited to contested cases in
professional licensing decisions, appeals from decisions of the director of revenue, and agency
rule-making decisions which do not rise to the level of a contested case. §§ 536.050, 621.045,
621.050. Maine's Administrative Court provides a second example. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
4, §§ 1151-58 (Vest 1989).
46. Felter, supra note 1, at 994.
47. Id. at 995. The states of Maryland, Hawaii and Tennessee have also explored public
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L. Felter, Jr. maintains that this mark represents an acceptable level of public
confidence.4" More importantly, Judge Felter shows us that there can be
accountability in a centralized system. 49 In contrast, a perceived inability to
directly address the source of unacceptable rulings from part-time hearing
officers or from permanent decision-makers hiding behind the cloak of larger
agency reputation and power seems very far from even the slight public
scrutiny that Colorado's survey system offers. Furthermore, the definite rules
of judicial conduct that apply to South Carolina's AI.s1° provide a recourse
not available in the realm of citizen-agency conflict.
C. Disadvantages
1. "Super Agency" Claim
The primary dissention over an ALJ corps approach comes from those
who praise the merits of agency policy and expertise.51 The term "super
agency" refers to an ALT panel that, through time, practice, and politics,
substitutes its own policy objectives for those of the individual agencies. 52 In
South Carolina, the legislative screening process that governs election of ALJs
is only as susceptible to political influence as agency head appointment. Thus,
it would seem unreasonable to conclude the ALJD is driven by inherent
political objectives to any greater degree than the agency hearing officers of
old. As for the ALJD's developing its own policy stances over time, one must
admit the potential exists. The measure of the harm, however, seems speculative, especially considering that South Carolina's AiJs sit for finite terms. 3
2. Trouble in Transition
Those states having recently adopted a central panel approach to AL
organization report significant hostility from the affected agencies.5 4 The
complaints most often stem from a sense of lost authority.55 A few states, like

perceptions of fairness. Ruth, supra note 7, at 322-23 ("Tennessee said that the increased
perception of impartiality and fairness by the public and the bar has been one of the most
prominent and satisfying benefits.").
48. See id. at 994.
49. Id.
50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-560 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
51. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Unified Corps ofALls: A Proposalto Test the Idea at the Federal
Level, 65 JUDICATURE 266, 274 (1981); See also, RICH & BRuCAR, supra note 2, at 13. Rich
and Brucar pose the conflict as "the trade-off between due process and administrative
effectiveness [or authority] that administrators claim they need to make and implement policies."
Id.
52. RICH & BRUCAR, supra note 2, at 13.
53. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-510 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
54. RICH & BRUCAR, supra note 2, at 18-21.

55. Id. at 20.
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Tennessee, avoided some of this conflict by implementing an intermediate
stage of development; the Tennessee legislature made some resort to the ALT
voluntary.56 And eventually, the Tennessee system evolved into a full fledged
central panel with broad, mandatory jurisdiction.57 Taking a more aggressive
approach, South Carolina legislators intended to revise South Carolina's
agency statutes to conform with the SCAPA as restructuring took hold. 8
Progress has been slow, with the 1995 Revenue Procedures Act 9 being
perhaps the only real example of full conformance. In hindsight, a graduated
approach like Tennessee's might have eased the difficulties of transition, but
one cannot fault the General Assembly for its large initiative.
3. New Roles for Agencies
Professor James Flanagan has pointed out that, in South Carolina's
system, "agencies without boards or commissions have a new problem of
insuring that the agency position and policy reasons are in the record, because
there will not be any opportunity for the agency to review the ALT decision."' This point highlights earlier questions as to whose policy goals and
how much room for exerting policy objectives (also referred to as "agency
expertise") should be incorporated into an administrative system of adjudication. Without doubt, Professor Flanagan has it right, but the AUD's hearing
process is perfectly equipped to take note of agency policy arguments and
determine the proper weight to be given. Surely, having agencies stand up and
speak for themselves is not too great a burden and may even have some
positive ramifications.
IV. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

A. Obtaining ALI Review
A party seeking review of agency action must first exhaust all administrative remedies. 6 This rule is based on ideals of judicial economy--the
prevention of piece-meal and potentially vexatious litigation.62 In an imprecise statutory structure, a party's having exhausted all administrative remedies
may depend greatly upon whether the agency is willing to identify any

56.
57.
58.
(Sept.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 19.
Id.
Interview with Stephen P. Bates, Judge (Seat 2), S.C. ALI Division, in Columbia, S.C.
13, 1996).
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-60-10 to -3390 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
Flanagan, supra note 43, at 81.
2 COOPER, supra note 9, at 572.
Id. at 573.
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particular action as its final decision. 3 Mr. Frank E. Cooper, author of State
Administrative Law, notes the potential for abuse in this traditional regime:
Occasionally, agencies utilize techniques which suggest that an attempt is
being made to exhaust the petitioner before he exhausts the administrative
proceedings, in order to avoid judicial review ....
[]f delay on the part
of an agency in deciding a case is so long and unreasonable, and so
productive of hardship, as to evidence a complete disregard of a party's

substantial rights, it may be considered that all effective possibilities of
obtaining administrative relief have been exhausted, and an appeal to the
courts permitted. 64

According to South Carolina Code section 1-23-380(B), ALJs have much the
same review authority as circuit courts when the ALJD sits in an appellate
capacity.' As such, the decisions of certain agencies should be subject to the
same grant of intermediate review that Mr. Cooper refers to above. Unfortunately, this same intermediate level review is not available when a party
contests the actions of an agency whose actions fall outside the scope of the
ALJD's limited appellate jurisdiction.' Moreover, is it not at all clear that
the regular courts regard this sort of intermediate relief as efficacious. 7

63. See id. at 585. Mr. Cooper cites two cases to illustrate the point. One, DetroitEdison Co.
v. State, 105 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. 1960), resembles a taxpayer dilemma recently resolved in
South Carolina by enactment of the new Revenue Procedures Act. See SCE&G, Docket Nos. 95ALJ-17-0466-CC and 95-ALJ-17-0485-CC (August 1995). In DetroitEdison, the taxpayer filed
for judicial review of a twice computed and twice disputed franchise fee. 105 N.W.2d at 228.
In an attempt to bar the case from judicial review, the State Corporation and Securities
Commission rescinded its second computation of a tax deficiency and claimed the appealing
corporation had not exhausted its administrative remedies. Id. at 231-32. The Michigan Supreme
Court held that this sort of avoidance of a final agency action was improper and remanded the
case to the lower court's jurisdiction. Id. at 233-34, 237.
South Carolina citizens seeking judicial review are certainly not immune to agency
recalcitrance. See Stono River Envtl. Protection Ass'n v. South Carolina Dep't of Health &
Envtl. Control, 305 S.C. 90, 406 S.E.2d 340 (1991).
64. 2 COOPER, supra note 9, at 585.
65. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995) actually refers back to § 1-23380(A) for the grant: "A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action is immediately
reviewable if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy." One
might argue that this language would always assure an avenue to expeditious relief; however, in
the face of statutes like S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-60-3390 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995) (mandating
dismissal of all revenue actions brought to the circuit court without first visiting the ALJ
Division), such confidence dims.
66. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
67. Nucor Steel v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 312 S.C. 79, 439 S.E.2d 270 (1994); Ross v.
MUSC, _ S.C. _, _ 435 S.E.2d 877, 878-79 (1993) (holding that "[a] petition for judicial
review pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380 is neither a proceeding at first instance nor is
it within the original jurisdiction of the circuit court"). But see Stanton v. Town of Pawleys
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On the other hand, progressive statutes like South Carolina's new
Revenue Procedures Act (RPA)68 curtail the potential for this type of abuse.
Section 12-60-460 of the RPA begins with the requirement that a taxpayer
exhaust "his [or her] prehearing remedy" prior to requesting a contested case
hearing before the ALJD.69 "Prehearing remedy" is a defined term; it means
the taxpayer must file a written protest, attend a conference with an assessor
or proper agency official, and provide the facts and law supporting his position
to various agency personnel.7" With large liabilities at risk and the time value
of money ticking away, this definiteness removes what was formerly quite a
long lever arm for the Department of Revenue during settlement negotiations.
In other agency statutes, when the substance of prehearing remedy remains
undefined, the agency advantage is retained.
B. The ALJ Hearing and Beyond
When resort to circuit court is finally necessary, the SCAPA is rather
explicit, setting out three parallel routes to circuit court jurisdiction.
1. Agencies With a Board or Commission
In instances when an agency is governed by a board or commission, the
AL decision in a contested case goes back to the board or commission before
becoming a final agency decision worthy of judicial review. 7 On this return
trip to the agency, the ALJ decision may be accepted, modified, or reversed.' The board/commission review is, however, limited to the record.73
That is, no new findings of fact or conclusions may be made. This is the pure
central panel approach, and it places obvious limits on AL independence.
Thus, such a process lacks many of the foregoing advantages that might
otherwise be attributed to a corps AU.

Island, 309 S.C. 126, 128, 420 S.E.2d 502, 503 (1992) (citing Andrews Bearing Co. v. Brady,
261 S.C. 533, 201 S.E.2d 241 (1973) (holding that "the question of whether to require the
plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies [is] a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
judge")). Mr. Stanton argued that he should not have been required to exhaust administrative
remedies as such would be an exercise in futility, and the court agreed. Id.
68. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-60-10 to -3390 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
69. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-60-460 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
70. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-60-30(16) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
71. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-610(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); Flanagan, supra note 43,
at 74.
72. See Flanagan, supra note 43, at 74-75 (suggesting that the ability of a board or
commission to modify AD findings has been curtailed but it is "unclear to what extent").
73. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-610(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995). Moreover, this section
expressly delineates the appropriate standard of review when an AIU decision returns for further
board or commission consideration.
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2. Agencies With a Single Director
Contested cases between a party and an agency with a single director
become final agency decisions upon the AUL's issuance of an order.74 Judicial
review is directly to the circuit court without any agency opportunity for
modification or review.7" This arrangement is most like the Missouri and
Maine administrative court structures76 and should be attended by all the
advantages of ALJ independence.
3. OccupationalLicensing Boards
Decisions of occupational and licensing boards are final agency decisions
before they get to the AL." This fact alters the ALJD's function to one of
appellate review.7" Judicial review of the ALT appeal is, however, a matter
of right;79 it simply goes forward with a record developed at the agency
level. This arrangement also resembles an administrative courts structure and
affords the aggrieved party with all the advantages of an independent AUD.
V. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS - HOUSE BILL 3427
House Bill 3427 would have effectively converted South Carolina's mixed
central panel and administrative court system into a full administrative
court."0 The bill proposed expansion of the ALJD's original review authority
over contested cases and increased the Division's appellate jurisdiction to
cover appeals from South Carolina Coastal Council decisions." Agency
review like that which exists in contested cases under the authority of the
Department of Health and Environmental Control would no longer exist. If
H.R. 3427 had passed, all AILJ decisions would be final agency decisions
reviewable only by the circuit court, and South Carolina's system would
embrace the full advantage of ALT independence.

74. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-610(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); Flanagan, supra note 43,
at 76. The requisites of a final decision in a contested case are spelled out in S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 1-23-350 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
75. Flanagan, supra note 43, at 76.
76. Compare Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 621.015 to 621.205 (West 1988), and ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 4, §§ 11151-58 (West 1989).
77. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
78. Flanagan, supra note 43, at 77.
79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-610 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
80. See H.R. Res. 3427, 11th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1995); Flanagan, supra note 43,
at 80.
81. H.R. Res. 3427, 111th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1995).
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VI. CONCLUSION

Twenty-one states around the country currently operate their administrative legal systems in a form resembling a central panel. 2 South Carolina
makes twenty-two. Ours is not blind imitation of a thoughtless trend. South
Carolina's system is unique in its heightened degree of independence granted
to the ALJD.83 This modification represents an improvement of the first
order. Greater efficiency, fairness, economy, public confidence, and quality
rulings make up but a short list of the advantages of increased independence.
The costs, on the other hand, are slight. Thus, patience is in order for those
caught in a web of conflicting statutory construction, and graceful resignation
is the call for agencies being asked to divest a quantum of control. The
General Assembly will no doubt untangle the web, and the change is for the
better as control is moving towards its more practical location.
William B. Swent

82. MARVIN F. KrrTRELL, CENTRAL PANELS (1996). Chief Judge Kittrell's pamphlet sets out
vital particulars of the various state administrative systems that currently operate under a central
pool of adjudicators. Id. The pamphlet also points out that, in addition to the twenty-two states,
the City of New York has a central panel administrative body. Id.
83. Flanagan, supra note 43, at 73.
* The author extends special thanks to the firm of Sinkler & Boyd, P.A. for having provided
practical exposure to the field of administrative law and assisting in the development of this
article.
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